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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE "DOCTRINE" 
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Philip B. Kurland* 
As the Constitution of the United States nears its two hundredth 
anniversary, there is a frenzy of celebration. However awesome the 
accomplishment, I submit that it is no slander to recognize that the 
1787 document was born of prudent compromise rather than princi-
ple, that it derived more from experience than from doctrine, and that 
it was received with an ambivalence in no small part attributable to its 
ambiguities. Indeed, its most stalwart supporters doubted its capacity 
for a long life. It should not be surprising, then, that even today there 
is disagreement over whether the Constitution of 1787 is now merely 
an artifact of late eighteenth-century American history or a vade 
mecum which has, in fact, controlled the allocation of government 
powers and the restraints on those powers throughout the two centu-
ries since its birth. 
The fact is - to use Professor Paul Freund's language - that the 
Constitution is, and has been from the beginning, both a structure and 
an organism, which does not permit it to be treated merely as an 
upper-case statute nor, as Learned Hand might have had it, as a mere 
counsel of moderation. Parts of the Constitution use words and 
phrases that resonate with meanings derived from history and the 
common law. Parts of the Constitution will necessarily have meanings 
dependent upon the context in which they are being applied. Added 
to these are fundamental conceptions that are not attachable to any 
particular words or provisions, such as federalism and separation of 
powers, that must be worked out by addition and subtraction of lan-
guage and history. 
To oversimplify constitutional meaning, as we tend to do especially 
when we talk of the Constitution on celebratory occasions, is to ignore 
what in fact the Founders wrought. To sophisticate constitutional 
meaning, as we tend to do when we write "learned" articles or briefs 
or judicial opinions for the specialists who read them, tends to substi-
tute the subjective for the objective and to cover over the conceit with 
rhetoric. The document was a product of the Age of Reason; its un-
derstanding should come through the use of the mind. It cannot be 
* William R. Kenan Distinguished Service Professor, The University of Chicago. - Ed. 
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factored to provide easy answers even by the most modern of 
computers. 
The original constitutional notions of division of powers and func-
tions were based not only on "separation of powers," but on a concept 
of "balanced government" and of "checks and balances" as well. If 
the three ideas rested on a single base of mistrust - a mistrust of 
governmental authority concentrated in the same hands - they were 
far from the same in their forms. Checks and balances suggested the 
joinder, not separation, of two or more governmental agencies before 
action could be validated - or the oversight of one by another. Bal-
anced or mixed government involved separation, but by way of provid-
ing different voices for the different elements in a society, as with the 
Crown, the Lords, and the Commons in England. The anticipated 
elite quality of the Senate or its putative role as representatives of the 
States rather than the people thereof may be explained as a search for 
such balance. In fact, Madison's rationalization for the division of 
powers suggests a more substantial notion of balancing forces, but for 
him the forces to be balanced were multitudinous and not few. 
Separation of powers certainly encompasses the notion that there 
are fundamental differences in governmental functions - frequently 
but not universally denoted as legislative, executive, and judicial -
which must be maintained as separate and distinct, each sovereign in 
its own area, none to operate in the realm assigned to another. The 
tendency even today is to think of the constitutional separation of 
powers in these terms. What Madison wrote in 1788, however, re-
mains true today and has proved true in the interim. He said in the 
37th Federalist: 
Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of Government 
has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its 
three great provinces, the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary; or even 
the privileges and powers of the different Legislative branches. Ques-
tions daily occur in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity 
which reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in 
political science. 1 
The consequence has been that problems of separation of powers have 
more often been sought to be resolved by invoking one or the other of 
the classifications as a shibboleth, what Holmes and Cardozo referred 
to as judgment by labels. 
The life of the Constitution, however, from its birth to its bicenten-
nial has not been theory but experience. This proposition is not 
merely a paraphrase of Holmes' famed dictum in The Common Law 
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 235 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
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about law and logic.2 It was recognized and acknowledged at the 
Convention of 1787. On August 13, Mr. Dickinson of Delaware re-
marked: "Experience must be our only guide. Reason may mislead 
us."3 Both Holmes and Dickinson were discounting deductive logic in 
favor of assaying effects that were known rather than those merely 
inferred a priori. The notion has been iterated by prominent contem-
porary historians. Thus, Professor Edmund S. Morgan wrote: 
The social compact, fundamental law, the separation of powers, human 
equality, religious freedom, and the superiority of republican govern-
ment were continuing ideals .... 
But if Englishmen supplied the intellectual foundation both for the 
overthrow of English rule and for the construction of republican govern-
ment, Americans put the ideas into practice and drew on American ex-
perience and tradition to devise refinements and applications of the 
greatest importance. . . . 
... The separation of governmental powers into a bicameral legisla-
ture, an executive and a judiciary, which was an older and more familiar 
way of checking depravity, was rendered far more effective by the exist-
ence of a written constitution resting directly on popular approval. The 
written constitution also proved its effectiveness in later years by perpet-
uating in America the operation of judicial review, of executive veto, and 
of a powerful upper house of the legislature, all of which had been or 
would be lost in England, where the constitution was unwritten and con-
sisted of customary procedures that could be altered at will by 
Parliament. 4 
The American concept of separation of powers - if I may now use 
that term as shorthand - is the prime example of the proposition that 
experience rather than theory grounds the Constitution. In no small 
part, this consequence is attributable to necessity rather than choice. 
In part, the necessity derives from the fact that, Professor Morgan -
and Montesquieu and John Adams - to the contrary notwithstand-
ing, separation of powers as adopted by the American Constitution 
had no true precedents either in fact or in theory. As Professor 
Gordon Wood so successfully demonstrated in The Creation of the 
American Republic 1776-1787, 5 because the new American govern-
ment was sui generis, it was not possible to trace all its provisions to 
any of the almost unlimited antecedents invoked at the Convention or 
2. o.w. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) ("The life of the law has not been logic: it 
has been experience."). 
3. DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN 
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 533 (C. Tansill ed. 1927). 
4. Morgan, The American Revolution Considered as an Intellectual Movement, in CAUSES 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 172, 185, 189 (E. Wright ed. 1966). 
5. G. Woon, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969). 
December 1986] Separation of Powers 595 
to the only slightly smaller number of political savants to whom ap-
peal was equally readily made. 
Montesquieu was often credited at the time of the founding as well 
as since with being the inventor of the tripartite system of separated 
powers, or at least was thought to have discovered it in the English 
system of government. Montesquieu was himself more modest. He 
deserves to be heard in his own words: 
Whoever shall read the admirable treatise of Tacitus on the manners 
of the Germans, will find that it is from them the English have borrowed 
the idea of their political government. This beautiful system was in-
vented first in the woods . 
. . . It will perish when the legislative power shall be more corrupt 
than the executive. 
It is not my business to examine whether the English actually enjoy 
this liberty, or not. Sufficient it is for my purpose to observe, that it is 
established by their laws; and I inquire no further. 6 
Perhaps the only political theorists of equal stature to Montesquieu 
in the eyes of the new constitution-makers were John Locke and James 
Harrington. Locke, too, saw a tripartite division of functions, that is, 
he asserted three classes of powers: legislative, executive, and federa-
tive, the last being what we might today term the "foreign affairs 
power," and this he allocated to the executive branch.7 Harrington's 
Oceana sounded more like a plan for balanced government, but he had 
a tripartite functional division: a Senate to propose laws, an Assembly 
to enact them, and an executive to enforce them. 8 The judicial branch 
was noteworthy by its absence in all but name in those programs. In 
all three plans of government - Montesquieu's, Locke's, and Harring-
ton's - all power was really divided between an executive and a legis-
lature. The judiciary lost its inferior status under the prodding of 
John Adams.9 
What Harrington and Locke shared that might well have appealed 
to Madison - certainly to Jefferson who was busily occupied in Paris 
and absent from Philadelphia at the time of the framing - was the 
notion of minimalist government. The structure of government was 
an important safeguard to the liberties of the governed for Harrington 
and Locke, but certainly of no less importance was the limited role of 
6. c. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. 11, ch. 6, at 213 ("Of the Constitution of 
England") (D. Carrithers ed. 1977) (f. Nugent trans. 1750). 
7. J. LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 382-84 (P. Laslett 2d ed. 1967). 
8. See J. HARRINGTON, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in THE PoLmCAL WORKS OF 
JAMES HARRINGTON 172-87 (J. Pocock ed. 1977) (Pakeman ed. 1656). 
9. See, e.g .• J. ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT (1776), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS 189-209 (C. Adams ed. 1851); MASS. CoNST. of 1780 (drafted by John Adams). 
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government. This attitude purported to be written into a constitution 
by limiting the national government to delegated powers, but then was 
written out of it with the necessary and proper clause. 10 There can be 
little doubt, however, that the Founders were exceedingly worried 
about entrusting their national government with power over them. 
Government was a necessity; it was not a good. And any man was a 
frail reed on which to rest other men's liberty. Thus, Benjamin 
Fletcher Wright, in his introduction to the John Harvard Library edi-
tion of The Federalist, noted: 
[T]he conception of human nature stated, reiterated, and depended upon 
in The Federalist is pessimistic or, in the most usual sense of the word, 
realistic. Men are not to be trusted with power, because they are selfish, 
passionate, full of whims, caprices, and prejudices. Men are not fully 
rational, calm, or dispassionate. Moreover, the nature of man is a con-
stant; it has had these characteristics throughout recorded history. To 
assume that it will alter for the better would be a betrayal of generations 
unborn. 11 
The American constitution of 1787 made the notion of separation 
of powers both more simple and more complex than it had been under 
previous regimes or in earlier texts. As Professor Gordon Wood has 
told us: 
Americans had retained the forms of the Aristotelian schemes of gov-
ernment but had eliminated the substance, thus divesting the various 
parts of the government of their social constituents. Political power was 
thus disembodied and became essentially homogeneous. The division of 
this political power now became (in Jefferson's words) "the first principle 
of a good government," the "distribution of its powers into executive, 
judiciary, and legislative, and a sub-division of the latter into two or 
three branches." Separation of powers, whether describing executive, 
legislative, and judicial separation or the bicameral division of the legis-
lature (the once distinct concepts now thoroughly blended), was simply a 
partitioning of political power, the creation of a plurality of discrete gov-
ernmental elements, all detached from yet responsible to and controlled 
by the people, checking and balancing each other, preventing any one 
power from asserting itself too far. The libertarian doctrine of separa-
tion of powers was expanded and exalted by the Americans to the fore-
most position in their constitutionalism, premised on the belief, in John 
Dickinson's words, that "government must never be lodged in a single 
body." Enlightenment and experience had pointed out "the propriety of 
government being committed to such a number of great departments" -
three or four, suggested Dickinson - "as can be introduced without 
confusion, distinct in office, and yet connected in operation." Such a 
"repartition" of power was designed to provide for the safety and ease of 
the people, since "there will be more obstructions interposed" against 
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
11. Wright, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST 1, 27 (John Harvard Library ed. 1961). 
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errors and frauds in the government. "The departments so constituted," 
concluded Dickinson, "may therefore be said to be balanced." But it 
was not a balance of "any intrinsic or constitutional properties," of any 
social elements, but rather only a balance of governmental functionaries 
without social connections, all monitored by the people who remained 
outside, a balanced government that worked, "although," said Wilson, 
"the materials, of which it is constructed, be not an assemblage of differ-
ent and dissimilar kinds."12 
The new form of separation of powers was not wholly appreciated 
when the ratification processes were in place. As Madison said in Fed-
eralist No. 47: "One of the principal objections inculcated by the more 
respectable adversaries to the constitution, is its supposed violation of 
the political maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary de-
partments ought to be separate and distinct."13 Federalist Nos. 47 
through 51 were devoted to refuting that charge, largely by revising 
the classic notions of separation of powers. 
It was evident from Montesquieu's resort to the British model, said 
Madison, that he did not mean that there could be no partial overlap 
of governmental functions in different departments. Montesquieu 
meant only "that where the whole power of one department is exer-
cised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another 
department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution, are sub-
verted." 14 So, too, Madison pointed out: "If we look into the consti-
tutions of the several states we find that notwithstanding the 
emphatical, and in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this 
axiom has been laid down, there is not a single instance in which the 
several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and 
distinct."15 Having disposed of Montesquieuan theory and American 
experience in No. 47, he proceeded in No. 48 to demonstrate that it is 
not sufficient merely "to mark with precision the boundaries of these 
departments in the Constitution of the government, and to trust to 
these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power."16 
It is to be recalled that he had conceded in No. 37 that it was impossi-
ble sharply to delineate the different powers labeled legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial. In No. 51, he justified the melange as "so contriving 
the interior structure of the government, as that its several constituent 
parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each 
12. G. Wooo, supra note 5, at 604. 
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 323 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
14. Id. at 325-26 (emphasis in original). 
15. Id. at 327. 
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332-33 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
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other in their proper places."17 The result was a new conception of a 
balancing of powers so well described in the quotation from Professor 
Wood. And here Madison recited one of his most frequently quoted 
arguments: 
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man 
must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be 
a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to 
controul the abuses of government. But what is government itself but 
the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no 
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither 
external nor internal controuls on government would be necessary. In 
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the 
great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to con-
troul the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to controul itself. A 
dependence on the people is no doubt the primary controul on the gov-
ernment; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary 
precautions. 18 
It must be remembered that some fundamental differences dividing 
the Framers were never mediated at the Convention. One concerned 
the identity of that part of government which posed the greatest threat 
to individual liberty. One group of some of its most powerful thinkers 
- Madison and Hamilton, for example - believed that the great dan-
ger was that a democratic legislature threatened to absorb all govern-
ment power. The other group saw the danger of tyranny in a singular 
executive, an attitude that had been expressed in the Declaration of 
Independence's indictment of the King and in the omnipresent fear 
that, unless he were George Washington, the man who controlled the 
army could use it to subjugate the people. The objective of separation 
of powers was to preclude the concentration of legitimate government 
authority in either Congress or the President. Frequent elections were 
one device directed to that end. But, as Madison remarked, "experi-
ence has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."19 
Thus, Madison, purportedly no friend of factions, nevertheless 
reduces the essential protection against tyranny to the multiplication 
of interests: 
Whilst all authority ... will be derived from and dependent on the soci-
ety, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and 
classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals or of the minority, will 
be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free 
government, the security for civil rights must be the same as for religious 
rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in 
17. THE FEDERALisr No. 51, at 347-48 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
18. Id. at 349. 
19. Id. 
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the other, in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both 
cases will depend on the number of interests and sects.20 
Even the most informed of the Founding Fathers did not anticipate 
the rise of national political parties. 
It is to be noted that, just as the judiciary played little part in the 
theoretical constructs of Montesquieu, Locke, et al., and although the 
Americans had clearly suffered from their courts' lack of indepen-
dence, especially the Court of the Vice-Admiralty, the debates and ar-
guments over separation of powers expressed little fear of judicial 
hegemony. Their worries focused on legislative or executive usurpa-
tion of power. Whether the judiciary as used in the tripartite systems 
of separation was regarded in the image of juries, which seemed to be 
Montesquieu's idea, or to be like the Courts at Westminster, the Fram-
ers were generally of a mind that the executive and the legislature 
ought to keep their hands off the courts. No concern was displayed 
that the courts themselves represented a threat to the other two na-
tional branches or to the people. (That the federal judiciary was rec-
ognized as a threat to another division of powers, that between the 
nation and the states, is another tale for another time.)21 
The national judiciary was recognized, as Hamilton put it in Feder-
alist No. 78, as the "least dangerous branch." 
It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judg-
ment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm 
even for the efficacy of its judgments. 
. . . [T]he judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three 
departments of power; ... it can never attack with success either of the 
other two; ... though individual oppression may now and then proceed 
from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be 
endangered from that quarter ... so long as the judiciary remains truly 
distinct from both the legislative and the executive.22 
Nevertheless, the judiciary was at the cornerstone of the concept of a 
"limited constitution" for which separation of powers was to be a 
guarantee, especially where the concern was to limit the authority of 
the legislature. 
"By a limited Constitution," Hamilton said, again in No. 78, 
I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legis-
lative authority; such for instance as that it shall pass no bills of attain-
der, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be 
preserved in practice in no other way than through the medium of the 
courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the 
manifest tenor of the constitution void. Without this, all the reservations 
20. Id. at 351-52. 
21. See, e.g .. Kurland, Federalism and the Federal Courts, 1986 BENCHMARK 17. 
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
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of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. 23 
Thus, the American invention of judicial review became an essential 
ingredient in the American version of separation of powers. Indeed, it 
was to become a most important practical element. In doing so, the 
judiciary may long since have exceeded the limits of its own authority 
as contemplated by the authors of the Constitution. Such a grand role 
for judges as presently exercised was certainly not in keeping with 
their status on either side of the Atlantic at the turn of the eighteenth 
century. Passing on the validity of legislative acts certainly could not 
be said to be intrinsically or exclusively a judicial function in 1787; it 
was equally exercisable by an executive council, as in Pennsylvania 
and New York, or by one part of the legislature itself. Madison would 
have provided for congressional - rather than judicial - review of 
state legislation. But, as experience of the last two hundred years has 
shown, the American judiciary need not be given power in order to 
exercise it. 
There are some of the highest authority who would not look at the 
doctrine of separation of powers as based on opposition of one force or 
interest against another. Perhaps because of the benignity of their own 
natures, their faith in the goodness of man, an unwillingness to find 
evil implicit in power, they would see only a specialization of function 
and comity behind the doctrine. Thus, Edward Levi wrote that the 
Framers 
did not envision a government in which each branch seeks out confron-
tation; they hoped the system of checks and balances would achieve a 
harmony of purposes differently fulfilled. The branches of government 
were not designed to be at war with one another. The relationship was 
not to be an adversary one, though to think of it that way has become 
fashionable. 24 
Alas, "to think of it that way" is not merely a modern fashion. The 
authors of the Constitution were more cynical, certainly Madison was. 
Remember the 5 lst Federalist: 
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several 
powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who adminis-
ter each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal 
motives, to resist encroachments of the others. . . . Ambition must be 
made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be con-
nected with the constitutional rights of the place. . . . 
This policy of supplying by opposite and rival interests, the defect of 
better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human af-
fairs, private as well as public.2s 
23. Id. at 524. 
24. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 371, 391 (1976). 
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 17, at 349. 
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I should reiterate that the underlying, if unstated, premise of all 
theories of separation seems to have been a minimalist government. 
The doctrine has afforded less and less adequate protection for the 
individual as government has grown into the Leviathan it has become. 
Constitutional law seems to have remained truer to the goal of separa-
tion of powers - the liberty of the people - than to the specific 
means it adopted toward that end. 
When we tum from the framing and the attitude of the Framers to 
the early execution of the Constitution by the first Congresses, the first 
Presidents, and the first Supreme Courts, it quickly becomes evident 
that the doctrine of separation of powers as a practical guide to the 
division of power was not to be determined by reasoning from princi-
ple to application. Rather, like the common law, and constitutional 
law as a whole, the principle tends to be derived from the actions -
sometimes contradictory - that are seen to have invoked this consti-
tutional doctrine. A few examples of our early history should suffice. 
Since the question whether a person may serve more than one 
branch of government at the same time has recently been called into 
issue as a question of separation of powers, perhaps we can start our 
capsule history there. During Washington's presidency, John Jay 
served for six months both as Chief Justice and as ambassador tone-
gotiate the treaty with Great Britain that still bears his name. And 
John Marshall continued as John Adams' Secretary of State even after 
his appointment as Chief Justice of the United States. 
Of course, from the outset, the first Congress was necessarily pre-
cluded from any appointment to the executive branch, since article I, 
section 6, clause 2, forbade a member of Congress from serving "dur-
ing the Time for which he was elected" in "any civil Office under the 
Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the 
Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time." 
Joint service in Congress and another "Office under the United States" 
was, in any event, banned by the same clause. But this stricture appar-
ently did not apply to those who served the legislative branch rather 
than in it. The Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, it will 
be recalled, was given an office in which he was made responsible to 
the Congress even though he was "the principal officer in [an] execu-
tive department." 
The originators of our government seemed somewhat reluctant to 
join different functions, especially judicial and executive, to the same 
office. Justices of the Supreme Court refused, as Justices, to pass on 
veterans' pension claims, although some readily did so as "commis-
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sioners."26 That kind of business did not fall within the description of 
their powers as set out in article III. Nor would the Justices venture 
to give Washington an opinion on the construction of a treaty, since 
such opinions were the duty of "the principal Officer in each of the 
executive Departments," according to article II, section 2, clause 1.27 
Similarly, the House of Representatives was rebuffed in its efforts 
to participate in the making of the Jay treaty, when Washington re-
fused its request for relevant documents.28 He acknowledged his duty 
to share those documents with the Senate, whose advice and consent 
were necessary to the treaty's validity. And when the question was 
raised in the House whether the Senate's approval should be equally 
required by law for discharge of the Secretary of State as for his ap-
pointment, the argument focused on whether there was implicit in the 
appointment provision the requirement of a parallel process for dis-
charge. Contrary to modern speculation, the House did not purport to 
establish a constitutional rule barring a requirement of congressional 
control on tenure. 29 
Jefferson, confronted with the question of the authority of the 
United States to negotiate the acquisition of the territory of Louisiana, 
doubted his capacity to do so because of the absence of a constitutional 
provision relating to acquiring territory. There was no question here 
whether the power to act belonged to him or to Congress or to the 
judicial branch, but whether the people had given it to the national 
government at all. But this, I submit, was the way that the early mem-
bers of our government decided questions of allocation of power 
among the three branches: it was not so much whether the power was 
legislative, executive, or judicial in nature, but where it was found to 
have been allocated in the basic document. Separation of powers was 
not then a rule of decision; it was a construct on which a constitution 
was framed, not a measure of the validity of a particular government 
action. What did the Constitution say or imply was the question for 
these early governors. Thus, when Jefferson's archenemy John Mar-
shall came to justify the acquisition of the territories acquired from 
France and Spain, he had no trouble resting it in the treaty power and 
the national government's apparently undivided power to make war.30 
26. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). 
27. Letter from Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington (Aug. 8, 
1793), reprinted in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 488 (H. John· 
ston ed. 1891). 
28. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 112 (1972). 
29. See P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 75-103 (1978). 
30. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542-43 (1828). 
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It was still early days when the judicial branch, in holding a con-
gressional statute invalid for the first time, declared that it was not the 
arbiter of the limitations on each branch of government except insofar 
as the governmental action in question impinged on the rights of an 
individual and the court had to decide in the context of a case or con-
troversy what the applicable law was. In an opinion that purported to 
be a self-denying ordinance, Marbury v. Madison, 31 the Supreme Court 
held that it lacked authority to issue an original writ of mandamus 
although authorized to do so by the first Judiciary Act, because that 
statute exceeded the grant of powers in article III. The Court resorted 
not to any general notion of separation of powers but rather to a sim-
ple search of the Constitution to see whether the particular power in 
question was authorized by that document. It clearly asserted that the 
judiciary had no general oversight powers to determine the propriety 
of executive behavior. Marshall wrote: 
It is scarcely necessary for the court to disclaim all pretensions to 
[''jurisdiction" over the "prerogative of the executive"]. An extrava-
gance, so absurd and excessive, could not have been entertained for a 
moment. The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of 
individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, per-
form duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature 
political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the 
executive, can never be made in this court. 32 
At the beginning then, I would repeat that it was clear that the 
doctrine of separation of powers was not a rule of decision. The ineffi-
cacy of resorting to a general notion of separation of powers to resolve 
contests between two branches of government has long since been 
demonstrated by our history. There are probably many reasons for 
this. Two of them are patent. First, to resort to the idea that there is a 
tripartite division of powers, legislative, executive, and judicial, each 
term self-defining, is to deal with phantasms. If we take the basic ar-
guments usually asserted that it is for the legislature to make the rules 
governing conduct, for the executive to enforce those rules, and for the 
judiciary to apply those rules in the resolution of justiciable contests, it 
soon becomes apparent that it is necessary to government that some-
times the executive and sometimes the judiciary has to create rules, 
that sometimes the legislature and sometimes the judiciary has to en-
force rules, and sometimes the legislature and sometimes the executive 
has to resolve controversies over the rules. And these variations be-
came more imperative as government became more invasive and com-
31. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
32. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170. 
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plex. Moreover, some parts of government have nothing to do with 
rules of conduct. There is nothing implicit or self-evident in any of the 
three labels that permits resort to the generalization about separation 
as a device, especially for the resolution of hard cases. 
When we shift our focus from the general proposition to an inter-
pretation of the particular allocations of power specified in the Consti-
tution, we face different difficulties. Most of these difficulties derive 
from the movement away from the idea that the national government 
was a government of limited powers to the current recognition that 
somewhere in the grants of power to the national government is to be 
found authority to act. The limits on government are not substantive, 
they are now essentially procedural; they no longer depend on what 
the Constitution says that any branch can do but what it says that it 
cannot do. In sum, one would have to say that if the separation of 
powers doctrine rested on a desire to protect the liberty of the individ-
uals subject to government actions, the protection is no longer to be 
found in the separation of powers but rather in the Bill of Rights, in 
the provisions of article I, sections 9 and 10, and in the fourteenth 
amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. Incidentally, 
if this be true, it explains in part why the realm of the judiciary has 
become more and more expansive in the totality of our governance. 
Limited government, or minimalist government, in Lockean or Har-
ringtonian terms, is a matter of ancient history; its demise is probably 
coincident with the growth of the idea of implied powers. 
Jefferson was pretty long-sighted in foretelling the arguments that 
would destroy the limits on the grants of power that the Constitution 
had made. In a letter to Edward Livingston, dated April 30, 1800, he 
wrote: 
The H. of R. sent us yesterday a bill for incorporating a company to 
work Roosevelt's copper mines in N. Jersey. I do not know whether it is 
understood that the Legislature of Jersey was incompetent to this, or 
merely that we have concurrent legislation under the sweeping clause. 
Congress are authorized to defend the nation. Ships are necessary for 
defence; copper is necessary for ships; mines necessary for copper; a 
company necessary to work mines; and who can doubt this reasoning 
who has ever played at "This is the House that Jack Built"? Under such 
a process of filiation of necessities the sweeping clause makes clean 
work.33 
Of course, if one reads the "sweeping clause," article I, section 8, 
clause 18, it readily becomes apparent that the only implier of powers 
that it recognizes is the Congress, whether the powers to be implied 
33. Reprinted in 3 THE WRmNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 443, 444 (P. Ford ed. 1896). 
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are those of the legislature, the executive, or the judiciary. The clause 
reads: "The Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the forego-
ing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof." The last part of the Clause - "and all other Powers vested 
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof" - remains to this day among the for-
gotten provisions of the Constitution of 1787. 
In any event when Marshall played "This is the House that Jack 
Built," just as Jefferson had predicted, in validating the incorporation 
of the Bank of the United States, he went beyond the sweeping clause 
in noting the necessity of not confining the Constitution to a strict 
reading of its terms. In McCulloch v. Maryland, he wrote: 
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of 
which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they 
may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal 
code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would 
probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, re-
quires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important ob-
jects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects 
be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.34 
But who is to decide what those implications are? Each branch for 
itself? And, when they come into conflict, as they did in Jackson's 
time over the very bank that Marshall had sanctified in McCulloch, 
where does one find the principle for resolution in the doctrine of di-
vided powers? Is it, as it was then, a question of which branch can 
bend the other to its will, presumably through the force of public 
opinion? 
Indeed, over our history, the most important contests for power 
between the legislative and executive branches of the national govern-
ment have been resolved by confrontation. Each side has weapons at 
its command to wound and maul the other. The most devastating at 
Congress' disposition, the power of impeachment, has had to be used 
with caution. It proved ineffective against the judiciary in the case of 
Justice Samuel Chase, and a losing and ineffective cause against the 
first President Johnson. But ordinarily the threat of its use is suffi-
cient, if the only goal is to remove a man from office rather than to 
change policy. Usually, impeachment and its threat do not cure the 
excessive aggrandizement of the office, as President Nixon's case 
clearly demonstrates. The judicial power of injunction, the legislative 
34. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315, 404 (1819). 
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power over appropriations and of contempt, the executive power to 
ignore challenges by other branches to its power by appeals to the 
electorate and its control of disbursements and appointments have 
been the usual weapons employed. Compromise has more often pre-
vailed than total victory by either contestant. But it is in this way that 
the separation of powers has tended to work, not in terms of pure 
doctrine, nor yet in terms of what assures the liberties of the people. 
Where the alleged overreaching of one branch or another impinges 
on the rights of a person, association, or corporation, the judicial 
branch has more and more often been called on to determine whether 
the challenged authority is legitimate. With the extension of national 
power to a general hegemony over the lives of the people living within 
its domain, however, the question thus raised ordinarily is not whether 
the governmental power exists, but by which office can it be exercised. 
For this reason, the claims resolved by judicial action have tended to 
be of not much moment because, at least as between the legislature 
and the executive, whichever choice the judiciary makes is subject to 
direct renegotiation by the principals. Thus, for example, when the 
Supreme Court declares the legislative veto unconstitutional, as it did 
in INS v. Chadha, 35 the legislative choice is to submit or to withdraw 
the delegation that was conditioned on the legislative veto. Were it 
not so weak-willed, Congress would reclaim its legislative power, most 
of which it has delegated without any grumbling about separation of 
powers. When the Court declares that the President has an executive 
privilege to withhold documents from legislative scrutiny, as it did in 
dicta in United States v. Nixon, 36 without a phrase or scintilla of legis-
lative history in the Constitution or its origins to support it, the legisla-
ture can still resort to its other powers to compel delivery. For the 
most part, however, what Learned Hand said in 1942 remains true 
today: 
A constitution is primarily an instrument to distribute political power; 
and so far as it is, it is hard to escape the necessity of some tribunal with 
authority to declare when the prescribed distribution has been dis-
turbed .... And ... granted the necessity of some such authority, proba-
bly independent judges were the most likely to do the job well. Besides, 
the strains that decisions on these questions set up are not ordinarily 
dangerous to the social structure. For the most part the interests in-
volved are only the sensibilities of the officials whose provinces they 
mark out, and usually their resentments have no grave seismic 
35. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
36. 418 U.S. 683, 705-08 (1974). 
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consequences. 37 
Perhaps if the question had been whether there was or was not 
government power to act, Hand might not have been so cavalier about 
it as when it was merely a question of which official should assert the 
power. The demise of limited national government has demeaned 
many constitutional questions, not least those of division of powers. 
In part, I suppose this is true because the office of the presidency has 
grown in size and so much of the so-called executive power is exer-
cised by multitudes in the bureaucracy. The result is that the enhance-
ment of the executive branch does not seem to be fostering the lone 
man on the white horse. Nevertheless, my instincts - perhaps be-
cause of my age - are with Mr. Justice Jackson, when he said in the 
Steel Seizure Case: "With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, 
men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government 
except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made 
by parliamentary deliberations."38 
To this point, I have concentrated on the origins and development 
of the constitutional concept of separation of powers. If the Founding 
Fathers had been right, that concept should have limited the growth of 
each branch lest any of them become dominant. If I tum to the ques-
tion of the growth of each of the three divisions, I think I have to say 
that the notion of separation has had little or nothing to do with it. 
Contrary to the expectations of such as Madison and Jefferson, far 
from bringing all government power within its ambit, the legislative 
branch has become the least of the three both as threat to and protec-
tor of the people's liberty. The executive branch has become imperial 
and imperious. And the judiciary has developed from that "98-lb. 
weakling" into the muscular giant, just as the ads of Charles Atlas said 
he could in the pulp magazines of yesteryear. 
It is true that the legislative power and the executive power have 
been like occupants of opposite ends of a seesaw: as one rises, the 
other declines. It is equally true that the balance has not remained 
constant, so that for much of our earlier history legislative power was 
the more dominant. 39 But for the last half century, the executive has 
been up and the legislature down. 
Explanations are not hard to come by. The first remains the 
growth of national government power so that almost nothing is be-
yond its scope. Early Congresses were in session for very short peri-
37. L. HAND, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE SPIRIT OF 
LIBERTY 155, 159-60 (I. Dilliard ed. 1960). 
38. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (concurring opinion). 
39. W. WILSON, CoNGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (Meridian ed. 1956). 
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ods of time. Even the first Congress, which had to establish the 
government, produced a volume of statutes that may best be described 
as miniscule. Today the Congress is almost never out of session, and 
its output fills volumes that can barely be lifted. But the result has 
been that the legislation that passes tends to be merely an outline of 
the problem plus a delegation of power to make the necessary rules to 
effectuate solutions. Congress has thus given away most of its author-
ity to make the rules for the governance of society. Second, there is an 
absence of discipline among the 535 members of Congress. It is a huge 
body without a head. Most of its legislation does not originate within 
Congress but is a response to demands or instructions from executive 
authorities. Too much congressional time is spent as agents of consti-
tutents seeking relief in the myriad of government agencies that Con-
gress has created but does not control. The rest of its time seems to be 
spent in trying to oversee the execution of the laws by way of investi-
gatory hearings which, in theory, are held to help frame legislation but 
which, in fact, are more devoted to exposure than to cure. The image 
of Gulliver among the Lilliputians readily comes to mind. 
The executive branch, on the other hand, has burgeoned. It con-
stantly grows stronger. Part of the cause for the disparity was well 
stated by Mr. Justice Jackson in the Steel Seizure Case: 
Executive power has the advantage of concentration in a single head 
in whose choice the whole Nation has a part, making him the focus of 
public hopes and expectations. In drama, magnitude and finality his de-
cisions so far overshadow any others that almost alone he fills the public 
eye and ear. No other personality in public life can begin to compete 
with him in access to the public mind through modem methods of com-
munications. By his prestige as head of state and his influence upon 
public opinion he exerts a leverage upon those who are supposed to 
check and balance his power which often cancels their effectiveness. 
But I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power 
in the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its 
problems. A crisis that challenges the President equally, or perhaps pri-
marily, challenges Congress. If not good law, there was worldly wisdom 
in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that "The tools belong to the man 
who can use them." We may say that power to legislate for emergencies 
belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent 
power from slipping through its fingers.40 
It might fairly be said that if any one thing was anathema to the 
Founding Fathers, or most of them, it was the notion of the royal 
prerogative. This much of the Declaration of Independence clearly 
40. 343 U.S. at 653-54 (concurring opinion). 
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was a well-accepted lesson. But who, today, would gainsay the words 
of Louis Heren in his 1968 book The New American Commonwealth: 
The modem American presidency can be compared with the British 
monarchy as it existed for a century or more after the signing of Magna 
Carta in 1215 .... 
. . . Indeed, it can be said that the main difference between the mod-
em American President and a medieval monarch is that there has been a 
steady increase rather than a diminution of his power. In comparative 
historical terms the United States has been moving steadily backward.41 
In part, the rise of the presidency can be attributed to the emer-
gence of the United States as the prime actor on the stage of world 
affairs. Whether this should be dated from the Spanish-American 
War, or from World War I, it must certainly be acknowledged as afait 
accompli since World War II. Wars create conditions in which even 
so reticent a president as Abraham Lincoln will place necessities over 
the niceties of political or constitutional theories. By the time of the 
second Roosevelt, the necessity for marshaling the forces of the nation 
toward the single goal of victory consolidated powers in the executive. 
We have been in a continuing crisis of foreign affairs ever since. The 
exercise of what Locke called the federative power - not one of the 
three divisions to which we have become accustomed - he placed in 
the executive branch by necessity. The Supreme Court has waffled 
about whether the power of foreign affairs is legislative or executive or 
some combination of the two. Certainly the recent decision in Dames 
& Moore v. Regan 42 suggested that the President's action in the Ira-
nian assets case was acquiesced in by Congress, but it takes a lot of 
judicial legerdemain to make this convincing. Whether presidential 
power is juridically justified, the certainty is that it is exercised. Presi-
dents have involved us in two major wars in Korea and Viet Nam 
without a declaration, if without the objection of Congress. 
Clinton Rossiter labeled the presidency of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, with approbation, a "constitutional dictatorship."43 He, at 
least, saw little 1C1ft of a tripartite division of power in the national 
government. Another historian, Arthur Schlesinger, saw in the Nixon 
administration an "imperial presidency,"44 and it would be hard to 
argue that power in the White House has ebbed since that time. The 
point is not that all national government power rests in the executive 
41. L. HEREN, THE NEW AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 8-9 (1968). 
42. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
43. C. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MOD-
ERN DEMOCRACIES 255-87 (1948). 
44. A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 187-98 (1973). 
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branch, but only that as between Congress and the President the latter 
has become clearly dominant and there is no evidence of a movement 
of the seesaw in the near future. 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court de-
scribed itself as "equal in origin and equal in title to the legislative and 
executive branches of the government."45 That might have been a bit 
of braggadocio at the time. It is a claim easily defended today. 
Whence comes the explanation? I suppose we can start with Jeffer-
son's early insight that it would be the Supreme Court that would 
channel state power into federal hands, from which it might follow 
that the court implicitly lays claim to part of the national power that is 
largely of its own creation. That is perhaps too subtle an argument. 
The fact is, however, that the Court, over the years, has been able to 
make a greater claim to public support than either of the two political 
branches. It has consistently wielded a wider and wider power of judi-
cial review. After a hesitant start in Marbury v. Madison, 46 and a dis-
astrous effort in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 47 the Court has been more and 
more willing to fashion new constitutional rules limiting both national 
and state action, with less and less reliance on the terms of the Consti-
tution, its origins, or even the Court's own precedents. More and 
more the Justices seem to be guided by principles of social policy de-
rived from their own innards. So long as both of the other branches of 
government do not seriously attempt to bring them to book, this judi-
cial arrogance is as unlikely to be abated as is presidential arrogance. 
Nor is the accretion of power solely in the constitutional field: it is 
at least as much to be found in the remedial powers exercised. And it 
would seem that the people are turning to the courts more and more 
rather than to the political branches for relief of their individual 
problems. One of our most eminent federal judges expressed the 
thought that resort to the judiciary by the citizenry is as much due to 
lack of faith in the other branches as to faith in the courts. In his 1969 
book, The Organization of Judicial Power in the United States, Judge 
Carl McGowan wrote: 
This [resort to the courts] implies a deepening disillusionment with 
both the efficacy and the speed of achieving reform through direct polit-
ical action, by appeals to legislators or to executive officeholders backed 
up by the threat of the vote. The mood seems to be to seek relief imme-
diately in court and not to wait for the next election. Although many 
thoughtful - and by no means illiberal - persons have sober reserva-
45. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 701 (1864). 
46. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). 
47. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
December 1986] Separation of Powers 611 
tions about this tr an sf er of political action from the ballot box to the 
courts, there is little evidence that the ordinary citizen is unduly per-
turbed about judicial intervention. He rather appears to like the idea that 
there is one branch of the government which can and will deal quickly 
and effectively with shortcomings in laws or obtuseness in their adminis-
tration. This may conceivably not be in the long-range interest of a dem-
ocratic society organized on the assumptions underlying our own, but 
the courts are confronted with the short-range problem of skyrocketing 
dockets and the new and novel issues intruded upon their attention. 48 
In addition to the fact that the courts seem to be the place to go 
because they tend to give the customer what he wants, making for 
popularity and power if not sensibility and good judgment, the growth 
of the courts' authority derives from the same source as that of the 
executive. An extraordinarily large part of the judiciary's power has 
been delegated to it by Congress. Legislation that, in effect, leaves its 
meaning and effect to be determined by the courts is almost as prolific 
as that delegating authority to the administrative agencies. 
Finally, I would suggest, the growth in the stature of the judicial 
branch derives directly from the failure of the principle of separation 
of powers to effectuate the objective behind its invocation. The powers 
of government were to be separated in order to protect the liberty of 
the people. With the growth of government, the safeguard thought to 
be inherent in separation of powers has largely failed. The country has 
fallen back on the specific negatives in the Constitution which, as I 
have already suggested, are to be found in the Bill of Rights, the provi-
sions of article I, sections 9 and 10, and the clauses of the fourteenth 
amendment. The enforcement of these restraints has fallen largely to 
the judiciary; neither the legislature nor the executive seems capable of 
abiding by these negative commandments without help from the judi-
ciary. Acting as surrogate for the original purpose of the separation of 
powers concept is enough to enlarge the ego and the image. Indeed, 
there are times when it seems that there is nothing between the poten-
tial tyranny of the political branches and the liberty of the people but a 
vigilant judicial branch. It is to be hoped if not expected that the judi-
ciary will have the intelligence, good will, and judgment not to go the 
way of all flesh. 
Madison, it will be recalled, sought to assure individual freedom -
the catchword was then "liberty" - by the devices of dividing govern-
ment between nation and states and subdividing federal government 
among its branches. These divisions were essentially substantive in 
nature. Federalism and separation of powers as they were known to 
48. C. MCGOWAN, THE ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 82 
(1969). 
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the Founders have been retained largely in name, if at all. Essentially, 
we rely on other devices to try to avoid the tyranny at which the two 
constitutional principles were aimed. Among them have been the ori-
gins and development of the national party system and the pretensions 
of the press to being a fourth branch of government. 
In fact, the problems of government power are distinctly different 
today from what they were in 1787. We have moved from the mini-
malist form of government to what Felix Frankfurter once euphemis-
tically labeled "the service state." Almost no subject of human 
behavior or human relationships can now be said to be beyond the ken 
of government. The last stronghold of individual freedom, the relation 
of man to his God, is even now becoming a subject for governmental 
ordering. Moreover, we suffer more and more from what Mr. Justice 
Brandeis called the "curse of bigness." This was translated by Judge 
Learned Hand this way: 
As the social group grows too large for mutual contact and appraisal, life 
quickly begins to lose its flavor and significance. Among multitudes rela-
tions must become standardized; to standardize is to generalize, and to 
generalize is to ignore all those authentic features which mark, and 
which indeed alone create, an individual. Not only is there no compen-
sation for our losses, but most of our positive ills have directly resulted 
from great size. With it has indeed come the magic of modem commu-
nication and quick transport; but out of these has come the sinister appa-
ratus of mass suggestion and mass production. Such devices, always 
tending more and more to reduce us to a common model, subject us -
our hard-won immunity now gone - to epidemics of hallowed catch-
word and formula. The herd is regaining its ancient and evil primacy; 
civilization is being reversed, for it has consisted of exactly the opposite 
process of individualization - witness the history of law and morals.49 
Jefferson would have said not that civilization was being reversed 
but that liberty was being lost. 
We are left now not with substantive limitations against govern-
ment tyranny, but with procedural ones. We have become dependent 
for what freedoms are left to us on another underlying principle of the 
Constitution - like federalism and separation of powers not men-
tioned in haec verba in the document - one that is also an inheritance 
from the English, "the rule of law." The rule of law requires that 
government not act except according to preestablished rule, that it ap-
ply the rule according to preestablished procedure, and that the same 
rule be applied equally to all. Obviously, like federalism and the sepa-
49. L. HAND, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 166, 170-71 (I. Dilliard ed. 
1960). 
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ration of powers, the concept of the rule of law is an ideal. It is the 
last best hope for avoiding the arbitrary tyranny of government. 
Bernard Bailyn demonstrated that the essential cause of the Amer-
ican Revolution was the "corruption" of the English Constitution by 
King George III and his ministry.50 At its two hundredth anniver-
sary, the American Constitution may well be suffering a similar fate. 
It may not be amiss to recall the implications of Benjamin Franklin's 
words when he emerged from the 1787 Convention and was asked 
what form of government it had given the American people. He re-
plied: "A republic, if you can keep it."51 
so. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967). 
51. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787 85 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). 
